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Tyler Andrew Ward. Brain Pod 57 voice. Steve Menteer. Show all 15 episodes. Car Salesman voice. Could you clarify what you had in mind by that? On your second point: we share your worry about ableism in attributions of creepiness, especially as it relates to neurodiverse people, and discuss it at some length in the longer paper. I think that, unfortunately, such false positive misdiagnoses are fairly common.
Part of the value of developing an account of when the creeps is fitting when it accurately represents its intentional object is so that we can explain WHY these types of cases are usually false positives and help people start to recalibrate their emotional dispositions to reduce the incidence of such false positive misdiagnoses. On our view, only moral insensitivity is relevant to being a creep. Hence, our discussion provides yet another reason not that one was needed to do better at educating people about neurodiversity.
We also include a section about more general epistemic obstacles to accurately identifying creepiness that would be relevant to this point. Hi Polaris! Let me echo Rachel in thanking you for your thoughtful post. Also, we want to thank the blog and David Shoemaker for the platform to discuss our ideas! As Rachel said, above, we agree that not all misogynists come across as creepy. Another way of putting this, more positively, is that while, perhaps, the term originated or was popularized to discuss certain instances of misogyny, there is ample reason to extend those original insights beyond that domain.
In other words, perhaps age is a mitigating factor. Or perhaps what is morally insensitive varies by age. What do you think? But, we disagree with your first sentence. Second, we deny that all blameworthy moral wrongdoing involves moral insensitivity as we understand that term. As we say in the post, moral insensitivity is, or reflects, egregiously mistaken judgments about moral considerations.
Or, if blameworthy moral wrongdoing is ever unavoidable, then a person in such a dilemma might be highly sensitive to morality, but simply be unable to act in a morally acceptable way. For these and other reasons, on our account, being morally sensitive does not entail acting in a morally acceptable way. The two cases you provide, at least on the face of it seem like fairly clear cut cases blameless wrong-doing.
It seems that attending to the right sort of considerations and giving them the right weight is the sort of thing that agents who act responsibly i. But, if someone has acted responsibly, they cannot be blameworthy even if they, through bad moral luck, end up committing some moral wrong. Similarly, being unable to avoid wrongdoing seems to be the sort of thing that undermines moral responsibility[2]. For instance, someone who has driven carefully and done their best to avoid injuring others has behaved responsibly.
As such she is not morally responsible[2] for accidentally wronging someone. English is a weird language. Forgot to add: Perhaps some counterexample would be useful here. What I had in mind about indirect displays of moral insensitivity is the following. If someone behaves in an overtly morally insensitive way, such as calling people names, engaging in or promoting violence, et cetera, I am not disposed to feel the creeps or to think of this person as creepy.
But that was my thinking regarding indirect displays. Are you thinking of this as a subspecies of a broader phenomenon? Is that going to end up being a matter of insensitivity to social cues more generally?
It strikes me that perhaps one way the rules of etiquette might have value is by helping us avoid creeping others out. Postscript: A quick glance through your paper that you linked above shows me that you think all creeps are moral creeps. I wonder if we simply have a clash of intuition or rather feeling here. I do find myself feeling the creeps towards unrepentant mass murderers, lynch mobs, and other such people.
As I mentioned, watching the violent protagonists in movie Get Out prompted much of these reflections. Would you say that psychopathic violent criminals like Jeffrey Dahmer never give you the creeps? Perhaps this is where your point about anger, outrage, terror, and so on enters the picture. So let us agree that these other emotions might well swamp the creeps on occasion. We discuss in Section 6 of the paper the case of George Zimmerman, the man who pursued and killed Trayvon Martin.
Although it seems to me that such pursuit was creepy, fear or terror rather than the creeps might well have been the more prudentially appropriate emotion for Martin to feel in the moment—and perhaps anger and outrage are the more morally and politically appropriate feelings for third parties to feel after the fact.
Perhaps the creeps is often most appropriately felt when there are no other more pressing emotions to feel, as when violence has not or not yet occurred.
Someone should write a paper about that. Thanks for the reply. On the face of it, the severity of the moral wrong is a distinct issue from the question of whether someone is blameworthy. I think this is true.
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